The problem of free will is one of the perennial philosophical problems that has occupied the philosopher’s thoughts since the earliest beginnings. Moving through an almost inexhaustible literature in the contemporary age only of discussions on the topic, the goal of the paper is to defend a libertarian conception of free will. The first step taken in such defence is the explication of some of the main thesis of determinism and compatibilism, which stand as the remaining two general positions concerning the problem of free will, so as to better understand what exactly is libertarianism opposed to. The second step is the very defence of a libertarian conception of free will in its agentcausal (A-C) variation which proves to be the closest to what people feel in their experience and also the link between the theory and moral responsibility. Starting first with the naturalistic foundations of this freedom we gradually ascend to a metaphysical view on humans free will by which, along the way, it also reveals something of our human nature that does not show itself to be only material. The metaphysical view of free will is the next step in the development of the idea of freedom from a fundamentally different viewpoint which show itself to be of importance if the human freedom is to be understood more comprehensively. Accordingly, it is argued in support of the thesis that naturalistic and metaphysical view do not, after all, contradict each other but, on the contrary, both methods of research work together thus complementing each other. Besides that, it is often heard or read that science has shown free will to be non-existent or just an illusion and so in the next step it will be necessary to show why that isn’t really the case. Science, in the end, does not refute free will. Likewise, observing the problem of free will between science and philosophy it’s also going to be necessary to say something about how the problem of free will could be solved if such a solution were even possible.