This work is looking to demonstrate one of the views that is growing in popularity in modern philosophy of mind. The aforementioned view or even a set of views could be lumped together under the term ''panpsychism'': under which consciousness has a fundamental place in nature. Panpsychism could be considered philosophico-scientific project in which both material and mental properties, subjects and phenomenal properties respectively, are reconciled. To understand the nature of consciousness and panpsychism this work tries to define material and mental properties in the right way and to see if they really differ. Panpsychism can be considered a kind of monism which formulates material and mental properties as equivalent properties and is an alternative to the so called materialism and dualism. Followers of materialism consider material properties to be fundamental and dualists consider both material and mental properties to be fundamental. Panpsychism is a very diverse group of views, so we grouped them under three kinds of views: a) micropsychism, b) general panpsychism, c) cosmopsychism. Micropsychism concieves the mental propeties as a categorical side of a dispositional properties of material world on micro level. World which includes entities and properties that physics studies. General panpsychism does not have to be different from micropsychism, however, mental properties are not necessarily tied to material properties on micro level. Under cosmopsychism, universe as a whole contains consciousness, however, there are multiple variants of the view. From the ones that claim that material properties and entities on micro level are aspects of one single universal subject to the ones that are completely idealistic and concieve all of the properties as mental. There are three problems tied to the aforementioned views. a) Combination problem, which is questioning if combinations of phenomenal properties and subjects happen at all, b) decombination problem, a problem under assumption of cosmopsychism that opens a question of how individual subjects are made from the universal one, and finally b) boundary problem, which is made under a notion that subjects have boundaries and that those need to be discovered wherever they are. The way of discovering them is important as well. The common property of all variants of panpsychism is that there is yearning to find a way of concieving consciousness as a object of scientific research. It does that in a way that reconciles mental properties with the world that can be considered material.