This bachelor's thesis has two purposes. The first one is to present an informative overview of the battle of Stalingrad in order to get a better understanding of the subject. However, the primary purpose is to analyse the effects of continuity and discontinuity on the battle of Stalingrad. The analysis of continuity is based on the fact that Germans made continuous mistakes from the time they finalized the details of Operation Barbarossa until the end of the battle of Stalingrad. Likewise, the analysis of discontinuity results from the changes (i.e. improvements) that Soviets made during the same period of time. My most important claim is that both continuity in German actions and discontinuity in Soviet actions had a decisive impact on the outcome of the battle of Stalingrad. Direct and indirect causes of the German defeat at the battle of Stalingrad are also examined by putting the battle of Stalingrad in a wider context. Continuous mistakes that led Germans to their defeat in the battle of Stalingrad are as follows: (1) the underestimation of the Soviet Union which led to a number of other continuous mistakes (2) the fact that Hitler was Supreme Commander and Commander-in-Chief of German armed forces coupled with his refusal to listen to the advice of his generals and military experts (3) having unreliable and weak allies (4) not using the opportunity to win the oppressed peoples of the USSR over to their side. The discontinuity in Soviet actions that was crucial for them to win the battle of Stalingrad is seen in the following: (1) Vasily Ivanovich Chuikov developed the tactic of “hugging the enemy” which reduced the effectiveness of the Germans. (2) Stalin was ceding control to his generals and thus allowed them to plan the Operation Uranus. (3) Soviet Operation Uranus had successfully encircled the Germans. Due to that, the Red Army was able to launch its final attack codenamed Operation Ring and finish off the German Sixth Army. Direct causes of the German defeat in the battle of Stalingrad include the brutal street fighting and the successful Soviet counterattacks – Operation Uranus, Operation Little Saturn and Operation Ring which resulted in the surrender of the remaining forces encircled in the city. The fact that Germany was not logistically prepared for total war is one of the main indirect causes of the German defeat in the battle of Stalingrad. Therefore, it can be argued that indirect causes include flawed logistics planning and execution, bad transport, insufficient supplies and a lack of troops.